Successor Liability for Defective Products: A Redesign Ongoing by Cupp, Richard L.
1Successor Liability for Defective Products: A Redesign Ongoing
Richard L. Cupp, Jr.1
Christopher L. Frost2
Successor products liability – cases where an injured plaintiff sues a successor
business for a defective product sold by a predecessor business -- is a doctrine
still under development in the courts, and the doctrine’s unsettled nature seems
destined to continue over the next several years. Jurisdictions may be roughly
divided into three categories. Several take a restrictive approach toward
liability in such cases (sometimes called the “traditional approach”), allowing
it only when relatively rare exceptions to a general no-liability rule apply.
Several other jurisdictions are less restrictive with successor products liability,
allowing recovery under the “product line” or “continuity of enterprise”
approaches in addition to the traditional exceptions allowing liability. A third
set of courts, also represented by several jurisdictions, have not yet firmly
established an approach. Following a 1999 law review article by one of this
article’s authors supporting the less restrictive product line and continuity of
enterprise approaches, and some subsequent judicial support for the article’s
position, some scholars responded that the less restrictive approaches are unfair
to predecessor businesses in cases involving unforeseeable risks. This article
challenges such concerns, demonstrating that in practice courts rarely impute
knowledge of unknowable risks even under strict products liability, and that
truly unforeseeable risks are in any event relatively rare. The article also
analyzes recent trends in successor products liability, finding a mixed picture
with some jurisdictions recently adopting one or both of the less restrictive
approaches, and other courts adopting or hinting that they may adopt the
restrictive traditional approach. The article concludes that none of the
approaches seem likely to become a strong majority doctrine in the near future,
but that corrective justice and public policy concerns favor utilizing the less
restrictive approaches.
As noted by Plutarch, “Time [is] the wisest counselor of all.”3 It teaches lessons.
It also proves predictions – including predictions about evolution of the law – to be on the
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2mark or errant. The American Law Institute’s treatment of successor corporate liability
in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability,4 completed in 1997, relied heavily
on predictions in setting its proposed standard. The Restatement (Third) sought, among
other things, to address the circumstances under which a successor corporation should be
liable for defective products sold by a predecessor corporation. It made the controversial
prediction that the “continuity of enterprise” and “product line” approaches (hereafter
sometimes referred to as “the less restrictive approaches”) to determining the liability of
successor corporations for products liability claims are dead to growth, and it asserted
that these approaches have been rejected by “a substantial majority of courts.”5
The nine years that have followed the Restatement (Third)’s predictions about
successor products liability have not been kind to them. Rather than a substantial majority
rejecting the less restrictive approaches, courts that have firmly taken a position are in
reality quite divided regarding an appropriate approach.6 The judicial landscape on this
issue remains varied, with some courts recently adopting one or both of the less
restrictive approaches, some courts recently adopting the more restrictive “traditional
approach,” and some courts remaining undecided regarding an appropriate approach.
The Restatement (Third) supports the traditional approach to corporate successor
liability for products liability claims. The traditional approach provides that an injured
consumer cannot sue the successor unless one of the following exceptions applies:
4 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (1997).
5 Id. at § 12 reporter’s note, cmt. b (“[A]fter an early spurt of cases in the late 1970s and
early 1980s arguing for more expansive liability, courts have refused to impose liability
unless the plaintiff is able to come within the four traditional exceptions.”).
6 See infra notes 40-129.
3(1) The successor’s acquisition of the predecessor was accompanied by an
agreement for the successor to assume such liability;7
(2) the acquisition resulted from a fraudulent conveyance to escape liability for
the debts or liabilities of the predecessor;8
(3) the acquisition constituted a continuation or merger with the predecessor;9 or
(4) the acquisition resulted in the successor becoming a mere continuation of the
predecessor.10
Critics assert that the traditional approach’s restrictiveness inappropriately shifts
risk from the corporation to the consumer, who is much less able to bear that risk. 11
Numerous courts have adopted the less restrictive continuity of enterprise approach
and/or the product line approach in response to that concern.
The continuity of enterprise approach imposes liability on a successor corporation
if the court concludes that the successor is sufficiently similar to the predecessor that it is
in essence continuing the predecessor's enterprise. In making this determination courts
look to a broad range of factors, including whether there is continuity of management,
7 See 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE




11 See, e.g., Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1154 (1st Cir. 1974) (finding the
policy reasons underlying strict liability of a manufacturer applicable to cases involving
successor corporations); Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 825 (N.J. 1981)
(holding that the social policy of products liability warrants expansion of the traditional
corporate rule); Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 8-9 (Cal. 1977) (justifying expansion of
successor liability on the basis of strict liability principles); Turner v. Bituminous Cas.
Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 880 (Mich. 1976) (stating that strict liability principles should
govern over those of corporate law).
4personnel, assets, facilities, and operations,12 whether the predecessor dissolves as soon
as practicable after the sale,13 whether the business enterprise continues uninterrupted by
the transfer,14 and whether the successor holds itself out to the consuming public as a
continuing enterprise.15 Continuity of shareholders is an important factor under the
continuity of enterprise approach, but courts may find a continuing enterprise even when
the predecessor's assets were sold to new shareholders,16 and even when the assets were
sold for cash rather than for stock in the successor corporation.17 The continuity of
12 See Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 883-84.
13 See id. at 884.
14 See id.
15 See id.
16 See Phillip I. Blumberg, The Continuity of Enterprise Doctrine: Corporate
Successorship in United States Law, 10 FLA. J. INT’L L. 365, 375 (1996) (stating that
while the mere continuation exception requires a continuity of shareholders, ‘continuity
of enterprise’ focuses on a basic continuity of the business); Michael D. Green, Successor
Liability: The Superiority of Statutory Reform To Protect Products Liability Claimants,
72 CORNELL L. REV. 17, 25 (1986) (stating that courts using the expanded continuation
approach can find liability although there was a change in ownership); Timothy J.
Murphy, Comment, A Policy Analysis of a Successor Corporation’s Liability for Its
Predecessor’s Defective Products when the Successor Has Acquired the Predecessor’s
Assets for Cash, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 815, 824-27 (1988) (discussing the expansion of the
mere continuation and de facto merger exceptions through case law); Howard L. Shecter,
Selected Risk Issues in Merger and Acquisition Transactions, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 719,
725 (1997) (explaining that ‘continuity of enterprise’ has its roots in the mere
continuation exception).
17 A sale of assets for cash will not transfer liability under the traditional approach absent
an agreement to assume such liability or a fraudulent conveyance. See Murphy, supra
note 16, at 817-18. For a successor corporation to be held liable under either the de facto
merger or mere continuation exceptions to the traditional rule, the shareholders of both
entities must be the same. See id. at 819-21. In the case of a de facto merger, the
successor corporation must acquire its predecessor’s assets with shares of its own stock.
See id. at 819. See also Pancrantz v. Monsanto Co., 547 N.W.2d 198, 202 (Iowa 1996)
(holding successor corporation not liable as mere continuation where there was no
evidence of continuity of shareholders); Harris v. T.I., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 605, 609 (Va.
1992) (same); Green, supra note 16, at 23 (noting that courts that have expanded
successor liability have eliminated the stock for consideration requirement of de facto
merger and mere continuation exceptions); Michael D. Kristofco, Comment, Successor
Liability: The Debate over the Continuity of Enterprise Exception in Ohio Is Really No
5enterprise approach does not require that the successor continue selling the same product
line as the predecessor, although selling the same product line is a factor that supports
finding a continuing enterprise.18
The product line approach imposes liability when the successor continues to
market a product line previously sold by the predecessor.19 It differs from the continuity
of enterprise approach by not requiring that the successor purchase the predecessor
business as a going concern for liability to attach. Instead, it requires that the successor
continue selling a product line sold by the predecessor.20
Debate at All, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 297, 301 (1994) (listing continuity of shareholders
as one of four factors necessary for a de facto merger).
18 See Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 81-82 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that a
successor corporation may still be liable under ‘continuity of enterprise’ exception if it
continues some, but not all, of the manufacturing activities of its predecessor); George L.
Lenard, Note, Products Liability of Successor Corporations: A Policy Analysis, 58 IND.
L.J. 677, 704 (1983) (distinguishing continuity of enterprise from product line on the
basis that under the former a successor may be held liable where it did not continue the
product line, but merely “uses the predecessor's name or trademark”).
19 See Dick Hoffman, Note, Products Liability for Successor Corporations: A Break from
Tradition, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 357, 357 (1978) (tracing notable cases from the 1970s
leading to the expansion of corporate successor liability); Roberta L. Schuhalter, Note,
Successor Liability for Defective Products: A Tort Exception to a Corporate Rule, 10
HOFSTRA L. REV. 831, 847 (1982) (same). See also Carol A. Rogala, Comment,
Nontraditional Successor Product Liability: Should Society Be Forced to Pay the Cost?,
68 U. DET. L. REV. 37, 49-50 (1990) (“‘[A] party which acquires a manufacturing
business and continues the output of its line of products . . . assumes strict tort liability for
defects in units of the same product line previously manufactured and distributed by the
entity from which the business was acquired.’” (quoting Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3,
11 (Cal. 1977)); Shecter, supra note 16, at 726 (same).
20 See, e.g., Dorit F. Kressel, Successor Liability in Products Liability Litigation: Modern
Judicial Response to Traditional Corporate Rules, 4 J. PROD. LIAB. 211, 221 (1993)
(explaining that the method of the corporate acquisition is not relevant under the product
line exception); Murphy, supra note 16, at 844 (stating that the product line exception
disregards the business aspects of an acquisition, instead focusing on whether the
successor continues output of the same product line); Mike Steenson, A Comparative
Analysis of Minnesota Products Liability Law and the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 78 (1998) (explaining that under the
product line exception, liability will attach regardless of how the predecessor was
6It is these two approaches that the Restatement (Third) in 1997 labeled “unfair
and socially wasteful,” and dismissed as a “small minority” that are the subject of
“overwhelming judicial rejection.” 21
In 1999, one of this article’s authors tested the Restatement (Third)’s
pronouncements in a law review article entitled Redesigning Successor Liability. 22 The
article examined the frequency of, and purpose behind, courts’ application of the
traditional versus less restrictive approaches to corporate successor liability in products
liability cases. Redesigning Successor Liability revealed that the less restrictive
approaches are not subject to “overwhelming judicial rejection,” nor are they even a
“small minority.” To the contrary, as of 1999 eighteen states had adopted the traditional
approach,23 and thirteen had adopted the continuity of enterprise approach24 or the
acquired). But see, e.g., Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., 159 Cal. Rptr. 119, 124-25 (Ct.
App. 1979) (imposing liability under product line exception although successor did not
continue identical product line); Pacius v. Thermtroll Corp., 611 A.2d 15, 158 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992) (holding successor corporation liable under product line
exception where it did not continue to manufacture the product line).
21 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. at § 12 reporter’s note, cmt. b.
22 Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Redesigning Successor Liability, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 845 (1999).
23 See id. at 853 & n.41. The count included states that adopted the traditional approach
through either state supreme court decisions, lower court decisions, or federal court
decisions attempting to apply state law. The eighteen states applying the traditional
approach at that time include Arkansas (Swayze v. A.O. Smith Corp., 694 F. Supp. 619,
622-24 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (applying Arkansas law)); Colorado (Johnston v. Amsted
Indus., Inc., 830 P.2d 1141 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992)); Florida (Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co.,
409 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1982)); Illinois (Nilsson v. Cont’l Mach. Mfg. Co., 621 N.E.2d
1032 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)); Iowa (Pancratz v. Monsanto Co., 547 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa
1996)); Kentucky (Conn v. Fales Div. of Mathewson Corp., 835 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1987)
(applying Kentucky law)); Maryland (Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564 (Md. 1991));
Minnesota (Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1989)); Missouri
(Chem. Design, Inc. v. Am. Standard, Inc., 847 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993));
Nebraska (Jones v. Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481 (Neb. 1982)); North
Carolina (Budd Tire Corp. v. Pierce Tire Co., 370 S.E.2d 267 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988));
North Dakota (Downtowner v. AcroMetal Prods., 347 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1984));
Oklahoma (Pulis v. U.S. Elec. Tool Co., 561 P.2d 68 (Okla. 1977)); Texas (Mudgett v.
Paxson Mach. Co., 709 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986)); Vermont (Ostrowski v.
Hydra-Tool Corp., 479 A.2d 126 (Vt. 1984)); Virginia (Harris v. T.I., Inc., 413 S.E.2d
7product line approach.25 Demographically, the eighteen states that had adopted the
traditional approach represented only 38% of the United States population,26 while 43%
of the population resided in the thirteen states that had adopted one of the less restrictive
approaches.27 Despite the Restatement (Third)’s death pronouncement, the less
restrictive approaches were likely being applied in more lawsuits than was the traditional
approach.28
605 (Va. 1992)); West Virginia (Davis v. Celotex Corp., 420 S.E.2d 557 (W. Va. 1992));
and Wisconsin (Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820 (Wis. 1985)).
24 States following the continuity of enterprise approach at that time included Alabama
(Asher v. KCS Int'l, Inc., 659 So. 2d 598, 600 (Ala. 1995)); Michigan (Turner v.
Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 881-82 (Mich. 1976)); Mississippi (Mozingo v.
Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 174-76 (5th Cir. 1985)); New Hampshire (Cyr v. B.
Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1152-54 (1st Cir. 1974) (applying New Hampshire law));
Ohio (Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co., 507 N.E.2d 331, 334 (Ohio 1987)); and
South Carolina (Holloway v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co., 432 F. Supp. 454, 455 (S.C.
1977) (applying South Carolina law).
25 States following the product line approach at that time included California (Ray v. Alad
Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 10 (Cal. 1977)); New Jersey (Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc. 431 A.2d
811, 817 (N.J. 1981)); New Mexico (Garcia v. Coe Mfg. Co., 933 P.2d 243, 248-50
(N.M. 1997)); Pennsylvania (Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106, 110 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1981)); Washington (Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 388 (Wash.
1984)); and Connecticut. See Sullivan v. A.W. Flint Co., No. CV 920339263, 1996 WL
469716, at *7, *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 1996); Kennedy v. Oshkosh Truck Corp.,
No. CV92 0510394S, 1995 WL 27400, at *2, *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995);
Copperthite v. Pytlik, No. 59053, 1992 WL 209660, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 25,
1992). New York courts at the time held the successor liable if it sold the same product
line sold by the predecessor or if it fell within the continuity of enterprise approach. See,
e.g., McCaffrey v. Weaver Jack Corp., No. CV 89-3910, 1992 WL 266923, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1992) (suggesting that New York has accepted continuity of
enterprise); Rothstein v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 664 N.Y.S.2d 213, 220-21 (Sup. Ct.
1997) (adopting the product line exception); Salvati v. Blaw-Knox Food & Chem. Equip.,
Inc., 497 N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (adopting continuity of enterprise). For a
discussion of New York’s current approach, see infra notes 104-118 and accompanying
text.
26 Approximately 100 million people reside in the eighteen states following the traditional
approach. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 28 (1997).
27 Of the 265 million people residing in the United States as of 1996, 113 million lived in
the thirteen states following one of the less restrictive approaches. See id.
28 See Cupp, supra note 22, at 856 & n.70.
8Redesigning Successor Liability also rejected the Restatement (Third)’s assertion
that the less restrictive approaches are socially wasteful and unfair. Redesigning
Successor Liability argued, to the contrary, that the continuity of enterprise and product
line approaches more effectively channel responsibility for products liability back to the
predecessor corporation than does the traditional approach because they force successor
corporations to consider the projected cost of the predecessor's products liability at the
time the successor purchases the predecessor.29 The article suggested that successor
corporations often could minimize their risks by purchasing relatively-inexpensive
insurance.30 It further advocated that the less restrictive approaches are more fair and
efficient because successor corporations are more able to predict, prevent, or absorb a
loss due to a defective product.31
In 2001, the Alaska Supreme Court embraced much of Redesigning Successor
Liability’s analysis in adopting the continuity of enterprise approach.32 Referring to the
article’s “channeling back” argument, the court reasoned that the continuity of enterprise
approach would “have the effect of encouraging existing corporations to produce safer
products, in keeping with the public policy goals that underlie product liability law
generally.”33 The court agreed that firms can protect themselves by negotiating a rational
purchase price that reflects the potential successor liabilities, and by purchasing insurance
where appropriate.34
Thoughtful academic debate has followed the article’s publication. In 2002
University of Chicago Professor Richard Epstein published a law review article
expressing concern that adoption of the less restrictive approaches may not in fact
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 See id. at 867.
32 See Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49, 55 nn.26 & 28, 56 n.35, 57
nn.40 & 42, 58 nn.49 & 53-55 (Alaska 2001).
33 Id. at 58 n.49.
34 Id. at 56-57.
9“channel back” responsibility as asserted by Redesigning Successor Liability, but may
instead lead corporations to liquidate or sell off assets piecemeal rather than sell to
successors. According to Professor Epstein:
What is overlooked in Professor Cupp’s channeling argument is the
possibility that the increased liability will result in scrubbing the
transaction . . . . One possible way to defeat all products liability claims
against successors is through a piecemeal disposition of the company.
Astute corporate owners could decide to sell off bits and pieces of the
assets to different buyers, engage in partial liquidations or dividends to
current shareholders, and then finally liquidate the rest. 35
University of South Carolina Professor Marie T. Reilly agreed with Epstein’s
concerns in a 2003 law review article, opining that “Cupp’s model of the transferee as the
least cost insurer of creditors’ loss misses an important limitation on the transferee's
capacity to channel or internalize creditors' risk of loss to the debtor.”36 Both Epstein
and Reilly also questioned Redesigning Successor Liability’s assessment of insurance
availability, arguing in effect that in cases of unknowable claims insurance is not a
realistic option, so the monetary burden will simply be shifted onto the transferee
corporation.37
This article addresses those responses and re-tests Redesigning Successor
Liability’s original theories and arguments. Part I discusses courts’ rulings on successor
liability since the publication of Redesigning Successor Liability. The part provides an
updated analysis of states’ current positions on successor liability, and concludes that,
contrary to the Restatement (Third)’s death predictions, courts continue to be split
regarding the less restrictive approaches. Some jurisdictions are newly adopting them,
and others are newly rejecting them.
35 Richard A. Epstein, Imperfect Liability Regimes: Individual and Corporate Issues, 53
S.C. L. REV. 1153, 1170 (2002).
36 Marie T. Reilly, Making Sense of Successor Liability, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 745, 790
(2003).
37 See infra notes 135-149 and accompanying text.
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Part II re-visits Redesigning Successor Liability’s original arguments regarding
the efficacy of the less restrictive approaches, and responds to the arguments’ critics. The
part discusses how the primary criticism leveled – that the less restrictive approaches
unfairly impute liability where the risks were unknowable – appears to be flawed. As
recognized in the Restatement (Third), courts generally decline to assign liability based
on imputed knowledge in products liability cases.38 Indeed, the scholars who developed
the theory of imputed knowledge of risks in strict liability – Dean John Wade and Dean
Page Keeton – later in their careers both repudiated their creation.39 This part also
discusses how, in any event, truly unknowable risks are rare. Part III concludes that the
continuity of enterprise and product line theories are neither dead to growth nor the
subject of overwhelming judicial rejection, and that despite critics’ concerns these
approaches continue to promote sound public policy.
I. A Redesign Ongoing: Continuing Division in the New Millennium
38 See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 480 (Cal. 1988) (“While some
decisions apply strict liability principles to such a [failure to warn] defect by holding that
it is irrelevant whether the manufacturer knew of the danger or should have known, . . .
most jurisdictions hold to the contrary. That is, liability is conditioned on the actual or
constructive knowledge of the risk by the manufacturer as of the time the product was
sold or distributed.”); Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 557
(Cal. 1987) (“[W]e hereby adopt the requirement, as propounded by the Restatement
Second of Torts and acknowledged by the lower courts of this state and the majority of
jurisdictions, that knowledge or knowability is a component of strict liability for failure to
warn.”). But see Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1147 (Mont. 1997) (holding
that “knowledge of any undiscovered or undiscoverable dangers should be imputed to the
manufacturer,” although recognizing that a number of jurisdictions have held otherwise);
Johnson v. Raybestos Manhattan, Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 549 (Haw. 1987) (“It is clear,
therefore, that in a strict products liability action, the issue of whether the seller knew or
reasonably should have known of the dangers inherent in his or her product is irrelevant
to the issue of liability.”).
39 See John W. Wade, On the Effect on Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior
to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734, 763-64 (1983) (“I now would be inclined to think
there is no longer any particular value in using the assumed-knowledge language.”); W.
Page Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law—A Review of Basic
Principles, 45 MO. L. REV. 579, 586-87 (1980).
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A. Jurisdictions Recently Adopting One or Both of the Less Restrictive
Approaches
Contrary to the predictions of the Restatement (Third), the new millennium has
seen no developing consensus on approaches to successor products liability. Some
jurisdictions taking a clear position on the issue for the first time in the new millennium
have adopted one or both of the less restrictive approaches. For example, in 2001, four
years after the Restatement (Third) pronounced the product line and continuity of
enterprise approaches dead to growth, the Alaska Supreme Court in Savage Arms, Inc. v.
Western Auto Supply Co. adopted and firmly supported the continuity of enterprise
approach.40
Savage Arms involved a lawsuit against the successor to the manufacturer of a
defective rifle. Jack Taylor sued Savage Industries after Taylor’s son was injured by the
company’s defective rifle.41 Taylor later amended the suit to add Western Auto Supply
Company, which had bought the rifle and sold it to a retail store in Maine.42 Western
Auto then brought a third-party claim for indemnity against Savage Arms, Inc., a
corporation that had purchased assets of Savage Industries.43 Western Auto ultimately
settled with the Taylors.44 The trial court then granted summary judgment in favor of
Western Auto against Savage Arms, holding Savage Arms liable as “the legal successor
to Savage Industries, Inc.”45
Savage Arms petitioned the Alaska Supreme Court for review.46 The court
granted the petition and framed the issue as follows: whether “a corporation that
purchases assets of the manufacturer of a rifle sold in Alaska [could] be held liable for
40 18 P.3d 49, 58 (Alaska 2001) (“We therefore adopt the ‘continuity of enterprise’
exception to the general rule of nonliability for corporate successors.”).
41 Id. at 51.
42 Id.
43 Id.




personal injury caused in Alaska by a defect in the rifle?”47 In addressing this issue, the
Alaska Supreme Court formally adopted the continuity of enterprise approach to
successor liability.
The court referred extensively to Redesigning Successor Liability in adopting the
approach, citing it seven times in a nine page opinion.48 Referencing the article, the court
reasoned that the continuity of enterprise approach encourages “existing corporations to
produce safer products.”49 The court also adopted the article’s reasoning that the
approach “will give manufacturing corporations additional incentives to market non-
defective products, in order to maximize the corporations’ market value in event of
sale.”50
Again citing to Redesigning Successor Liability, the court debunked the potential
counterargument that the continuity of enterprise approach would “discourage large-scale
transfers so long as anticipated successor liabilities do not exceed the value of the
corporation's accumulated goodwill.”51 Instead, the court concluded that the purchasing
corporation will merely take the potential liability into account in determining purchase
price and insurance coverage.52 The court also rejected the Restatement (Third)’s
assumption that the continuity of enterprise approach results in a windfall for claimants,
noting that recovery for legitimate injuries is not a windfall.53 Finally, the court
discounted the argument that successor liability conflicts with maximizing bankruptcy
estates, reasoning that bankruptcy creditors do not deserve priority over injured tort
claimants.54 Although the court ultimately reversed the summary judgment order and
47 Id. at 51.
48 Id. at 55 n.26, 57 nn.40 & 42, 58 nn.49 & 53-55.
49 Id. at 58.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 56-57.
52 Id. at 57-58.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 57.
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remanded the case to the trial court, it did so to allow the trial court to consider “the
‘mere continuation’ and ‘continuity of enterprise’ exceptions in the context of this
case.”55
The Alaska Supreme Court addressed the product line approach in the same
opinion.56 Although the court declined to reach the issue of whether it would adopt the
product line approach due to the particular facts of the case before it, the court left that
door open: “Our decision today does not preclude further consideration of this [product
line] exception in an appropriate case.”57
The continuity of enterprise approach appears likely to remain the law for some
time in Alaska. In 2002, Alaska Attorney General Bruce Botelho wrote an opinion letter
to Alaska Governor Tony Knowles regarding a legislative bill designed “to reject the
continuity of enterprise exception to the doctrine of successor liability adopted in [Savage
Arms].” particular.58 Attorney General Botelho recommended that the bill be vetoed.
The Attorney General’s opinion cited, among other things, the legitimacy of the Savage
Arms opinion, and the interest in maintaining a remedy for injured plaintiffs:
From a policy perspective, we think that the balance established by the
Savage Arms court is more appropriate than that established by the
Products Liability Restatement as codified in the bill. We think that the
modest expansion of the scope of successor liability announced by the
Savage Arms court was a legitimate decision by the court and do not think
it should be disturbed. This decision will help to ensure that injured
plaintiffs have a viable remedy when companies that sold defective
products sell their assets and liquidate.59
55 Id. at 58. An additional reason for the court’s reversal was the existence of unresolved
factual issues. Id.
56 Id. at 55.
57 Id. at 55 n.25.
58 Letter from Bruce M. Botelho, Alaska Attorney Gen., to Tony Knowles, Governor of
Alaska (June 11, 2002).
59 Id.
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Ultimately, the bill attacking Savage Arms did not pass, and the continuity of enterprise
approach remains good law in Alaska.60
In 2001, the same year Alaska adopted the continuity of enterprise approach,
Mississippi adopted the product line approach to successor liability.61 In Huff v.
Shopsmith, Inc.,62 Huff filed suit against Shopsmith, among others, for injuries she
suffered due to an allegedly defective Mark V power tool.63 Huff alleged that Shopsmith
was liable as the successor corporation of the tool’s manufacturer.64 After summary
judgment was entered in favor of Shopsmith,65 Huff urged the Mississippi Supreme Court
on appeal to adopt the product line approach.66 Ultimately, the Court viewed the product
line theory as a viable basis for recovery. As to Huff’s claim, however, the Court
recognized that the facts of the particular case did not meet the product line approach’s
requirements.
Two years later, in Paradise Corp. v. Amerihost Devel., Inc., the Mississippi
Supreme Court noted that the product line approach is premised on: (1) the successor
corporation’s superior position to assume the obligation of risk-spreading, and (2) “the
idea of estoppel and principles of fairness that a corporation that benefits from the
goodwill of a predecessor's product should also bear the burden of liabilities attached to
the product as well.”67 In that same 2003 opinion, the Court adopted the continuity of
enterprise approach, not in the context of products liability, but rather with respect to
“debts owed by the predecessor when the successor takes on the identity of the
60 The bill appears to have died in the House Judiciary Committee. See 2003 AK H.B. 13
(SN) 23rd Legislature – First Session (Summary—State Net).
61 Huff v. Shopsmith, Inc., 786 So.2d 383, 388 (Miss. 2001) (“[W]e view the product line
theory as a viable basis of recovery”).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 385.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 387.
67 848 So.2d 177, 180 (Miss. 2003).
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predecessor company in every way except taking responsibility for the predecessor's
debts.”68 The court did not dispute, however, the Fifth Circuit’s application of the
continuity of enterprise in a products liability case involving Mississippi law.69 Indeed,
Paradise Corp. cites to the Mozingo opinion for law on corporate successor liability,
including the continuity of enterprise approach.70
Although no Connecticut appellate courts have yet ruled on the issue, a
Connecticut Superior Court in 1999 adopted the product line approach in the context of a
successor products liability claim arising from injuries sustained from a fall from an
allegedly defective ladder.71 In Pastorick v. Lyn-Lad Truck Racks, Inc.,72 in the context
of an appeal from the granting of a motion for summary judgment, the court addressed
whether a successor corporation could be held liable when it neither manufactured nor
sold an allegedly defective ladder.73
The court recognized that the successor corporation did not sell or manufacture
the ladder.74 However, the court adopted the product line approach, and held that issues
68 Id. at 180-81.
69 See Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 174-76 (5th Cir. 1985) (recognizing
a lack of clear authority from Mississippi on corporate successor liability, but holding
that the district court did not err by instructing the jury on continuity of enterprise).
70 See Paradise Corp., 848 So.2d at 179-180 (citing Mozingo, 752 F.2d at 174-75).
71 Pastorick v. Lyn-Lad Truck Racks, Inc., No. CV 960562426S, 1999 WL 608674, at *2
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 1999) (unpublished). Three Connecticut lower courts had
already adopted the same approach. See Sullivan v. A.W. Flint Co., No. CV 920339263,
1996 WL 469716, at *7-8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug 5, 1996); Kennedy v. Oshkosh Truck
Corp., No. CV92 0510394S, 1995 WL 27400, at *2, *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995);
Copperthite v. Pytlik, No. 59053, 1992 WL 209660, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 25,
1992). At least one other Connecticut Superior Court has recognized the product line
approach without explicitly adopting it. See Sizer v. Goss Int’l, 2005 WL 1023244 at *1
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 31. 2005) (“Connecticut courts have recognized, however, an
exception to the general rule referred to as the ‘product line continuation’ exception to
successor liability.”).
72 Pastorick, No. CV 960562426S, 1999 WL 608674.
73 Id. at *1.
74 Id. (“The defendant moves for summary judgment. Its position is that it did not sell the
product nor did it manufacturer the product. There appears to be no controversy as to
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of fact remained as to whether the requirements of this approach had been satisfied.75
The court reasoned that, as a policy matter, successor liability “is a continuation of the
basic principle that between an injured consumer and a business entity the latter is best
able to absorb and to pass off to, the body of customers, the general public, through
pricing, the cost of personal injury sustained by ordinary citizens.”76 Otherwise, “the
injured party has no defense to the risk of non-compensation from a voluntarily defunct
seller.”77
The Savage Arms, Huff, and Pastorick opinions demonstrate that in the new
millennium the product line and continuity of enterprise approaches are neither dead to
growth nor the subject of overwhelming judicial rejection. On the contrary, courts
continue to adopt78 and apply79 the less restrictive approaches to successor liability cases.
Other courts may be headed that direction, but have not yet committed. For
example, an Indiana appellate court addressed the pros and cons of the product line
approach in Guerrero v. Allison Engine Co.80 The court went so far as to state that “[t]he
product line exception may be an appropriate means by which to balance the seemingly
juxtaposed concepts of strict liability under the Indiana Product Liability Act, and
manufacture and sale, as the complaint clearly reveals that the manufacturer and original
seller was A.W. Flint Company.”).
75 Id. at *1-2 (“Although no Connecticut appeals court has specifically dealt with the
“product line continuation” avenue of liability, this court is of the opinion that there is a
sound legal basis for the application of the product line continuation theory of liability in
this State. . . . It is not clear as to whether the defendant continued to produce the same
product line as did the Flint Company.”).
76 Id. at *2.
77 Id. at *3.
78 See Savage Arms, 18 P.3d at 58; Huff, 786 So.2d at 388; Pastorick, 1999 WL 608674,
at *2.
79 The last six years have seen various courts that had previously adopted the “continuity
of enterprise” or “product line” approach continue to acknowledge or apply one or both
of these less restrictive approaches. See, e.g., Dillman v. Indiana Rolls Inc., 2004 WL
2491772 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2004) (“The foregoing facts, as well as the entire record
developed in this case, clearly bring Park squarely within the product line exception.”).
80 725 N.E.2d 479, 483-87 (Ind. App. 2000).
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freedom of contract - long supported by common law, as well as both state and federal
constitutions.”81 However, the court stopped short of adopting the product line approach
because the specific factual circumstances before the court did not justify imposition of
successor liability.82 Tellingly, at least one Indiana appellate court has since cited
Guerrero for the proposition that “Indiana recognizes the product line successor theory of
liability in products liability cases under certain circumstances.”83 Professor George
Kuney recently predicted that “Based on the Geurrero court’s favorable treatment of the
product line exception, the Indiana Court of Appeals probably will adopt the product line
exception when it is presented with the appropriate factual record.”84
South Dakota is another example of a jurisdiction that may at some point move
toward the less restrictive approaches. In a non-products liability case, in which the court
analyzed only one of the traditional approaches to successor liability, the South Dakota
Supreme Court acknowledged the expansion of, and benefits of expanded, successor
liability in products liability cases:
All these exceptions . . . have, however, undergone some expansion under
the law of products liability. Strict liability in tort for defective products
applies regardless of negligence or privity. Liability for defective products
rests on the need to compensate eligible plaintiffs; thus, the burden of
economic loss is shifted not just to the manufacturer of the defective
product, but also at times to the successor manufacturer who by
purchasing assets from the predecessor is able to continue making the
same or similar products.85
81 Id. at 487 (emph. in original).
82 Id.
83 P.R. Mallory & Co., Inc. v. American States Ins. Co., 2004 WL 1737489, at *6 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2004) (unpublished opinion).
84 George W. Kuney, A Taxonomy and Evaluation of Successor Liability, 38 FLA. S. U.
BUS. REV. ___, ___ (2006) (forthcoming). 
85 See Parker v. Western Dakota Insurors, Inc., 605 N.W.2d 181, 185 (S.D. 2000). The
Parker case was one involving a contract dispute, so the court did not have the
opportunity to rule on the viability of the less restrictive approaches in a products liability
context. See id. (“Yet, these strict liability concepts created for the protection of injured
persons do not have the same expansive application in a purely contractual dispute. In
this case, we deal only with the interpretation of contracts to decide whether by
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Georgia may also be a candidate for formally adopting one of the less restrictive
approaches. Professor Kuney recently described a 1998 Georgia case not included in
Redesigning Successor Liability’s jurisdiction count as evidence that Georgia has
“impliedly accepted the product line exception.”86 Finally, in 2001 a federal district court
purchasing assets Western Dakota became responsible for First American's liability to its
employee.”).
86 Kuney, supra note 84, at App. 77. Professor Kuney’s article provides a laudably
thorough state-by-state analysis of general (i.e., not segregating products liability cases in
his analysis) successor liability rulings. Although his interpretations of state’s positions
are in most instances supportive of the count developed in this article and in Redesigning
Successor Liability, with a few cases the interpretations differ. For example, Professor
Kuney follows the Restatement (Third) in counting Massachusetts and Ohio as
jurisdictions following the traditional approach, whereas this article counts them as
jurisdictions that have not firmly committed to any particular approach. These
jurisdictions’ approaches are discussed in Redesigning Successor Liability as follows:
Regarding Massachusetts, the Restatement (Third) cites Guzman v.
MRM/Elgin, 567 N.E.2d 929 (Mass. 1991) as adopting the traditional
approach. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 29, § 12 cmt. c, Reporters’
Notes. However, Guzman only rejected the product line approach, 567
N.E.2d at 929-30, and did not address the continuity of enterprise
approach. In McCarthy v. Litton Industries Incorporated, 570 N.E.2d
1008, 1013 (Mass. 1991), a later case not cited by the Restatement (Third),
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court discussed the continuity of
enterprise approach, but stated that the facts before the court did not
require it to adopt or reject the approach.
Regarding Ohio, the Restatement (Third) cites Welco Industries
Incorporated v. Applied Company, 617 N.E.2d 1129 (Ohio 1993) as
adopting the traditional approach. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 29,
§ 12 cmt. c, Reporters’ Notes. However, in Welco, the Ohio Supreme
Court actually appears receptive to use of the continuity of enterprise
approach in products liability cases. See 617 N.E.2d at 1133 (“However
valid the justifications for expanding the liability of successor corporations
in products liability cases, [they] do not apply here.”) The court noted that
the facts before it in Welco did not involve products liability, and the court
rejected use of the continuity of enterprise approach in breach of contract
cases as opposed to products liability cases. See id. In an earlier case, the
Ohio Supreme Court rejected the product line approach in a products
liability case, but appeared receptive to the continuity of enterprise
approach. Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co., 507 N.E.2d 331, 336-
37 (Ohio 1987) (discussing continuity of enterprise, but finding it not
applicable under the facts of the case). In 1992, an Ohio court interpreted
Flaugher as having adopted the continuity of enterprise approach. See
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hinted that Nevada may follow California’s lead on issues regarding successor liability
(which presumably would include adoption of the product line approach, although the
approach was not discussed in the opinion).87 In 2005 the Nevada Supreme Court, in a
non-products liability negligence case, expressly left open the question of whether it
would adopt the continuity of enterprise approach in a products liability case.88
However, the decision, Village Builders 96, L.P. v. U.S. Laboratories,89 expressed some
concern about potential expansion. It cited a California case that referred to a 1998
Practicing Law Institute article arguing that the trend was against expansion.90 As
demonstrated in Redesigning Successor Liability a year later, in 1999, in reality there has
not been a trend against expansion in cases involving products liability claims.91
This confusion about trend directions may result to some extent from analyses
combining product liability cases and cases not involving products issues. Obviously the
product line approach would not be nearly as compelling in successor liability cases not
involving defective products, and thus combining products liability cases and other
successor liability cases adds a number of situations in which one of the two major
Davis v. Loopco Indus., No. 59594, 1992 WL 2590, at *3 (Ohio App. 8
Dist. Jan. 9, 1992) (“We . . . find that the Flaugher court adopted the
expanded test.”).
Cupp, supra note 22, at 853 n.42.
87 See Roll v. Tracor, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1082 (D. Nev. 2001) (“In Nevada the
State Supreme Court has not had occasion to consider the issue of successor liability. It is
reasonable to expect, however, that in a torts case the Nevada Supreme Court would
follow the lead of the California Supreme Court on this issue, because in the area of
products liability the Nevada Court has adopted nearly every holding of the California
Court.”).
88 Village Builders 96, L.P. v. U.S. Labs., Inc., 112 P.3d 1082 (Nev. 2005).
89 Id.
90 Id. at 1091 (quoting MBII v. PSI, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 778, 781 (1999)), which cites
Pollak, Successor Liability in Asset Aquisitions in Acquiring or Selling the Privately Held
Company, PRAC. L. INST. 77, 99, 101 (1998).
91 See Cupp, supra note 22, at 852-58.
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expansive approaches is not generally even considered, much less rejected.92 Further,
products liability cases have aspects that may make the less restrictive approaches more
attractive to some jurisdictions than they are in non-products cases – for example,
liability without fault is typically extended to products cases but not to most other types
of cases that may involve successor liability.
In addition to new jurisdictions explicitly adopting or favorably citing one or both
of the less restrictive approaches to successor liability, the last six years have seen at least
one court applying a continuity of enterprise approach, but disguised under the name of
the more traditional “mere continuation” theory.93 In Roper Elec. Co. v. Quality
Castings, Inc.94 a Missouri appellate court recognized that “identity of the officers,
directors, and shareholders for both corporations (although a substantial factor) is not a
precursor to invocation of the ‘corporate continuation’ doctrine.”95 However, in
concluding that the successor corporation was a corporate continuation of the
predecessor, the Missouri court looked to factors sounding more in “continuity of
enterprise,” including, among other things, the fact that the successor “continued the
exact same business using the same equipment and had the same customers as [the
predecessor], but never notified them of the change,” used the same trade name, “took
over the works in progress of [the predecessor], collected the accounts receivable,
operated in the same location, and had the same phone number as [the predecessor].”96
92 Professor George Kuney’s recent article addressing successor liability thoroughly
reviews the recent cases, but he generally fails to distinguish between successor liability
cases involving defective products and other successor liability cases in setting forth what
he sees as each jurisdiction’s position on successor liability. See generally Kuney, supra
note 84. Adding in numerous non-products liability cases in which the product line
approach is unlikely to be addressed leads to an exaggerated perception of the traditional
approach’s strength in products liability cases.
93 Roper Elec. Co. v. Quality Castings, Inc., 60 S.W.3d 708 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
94 Id.
95 Id. at 712.
96 Id. at 713.
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Tellingly, the Roper court held that a lack of continuity of ownership is not
necessary to a finding of “mere continuation,” despite the fact that the lack of continuity
of ownership is what classically differentiates the continuity of enterprise approach from
the “mere continuation” theory.97 By looking instead to factors such as the continuing
business operations, the Missouri court has, in essence, adopted a continuity of enterprise
97 See, e.g., Winsor v. Glasswerks PHX, LLC, 63 P.3d 1040, 1046 (Ariz. App. 2003)
(“The focus of the continuity of enterprise exception is to expand the traditional ‘mere
continuation’ exception that is part of the general rule. The traditional ‘mere
continuation’ exception applies ‘only when there is a common identity of officers,
directors and stock between the selling and purchasing corporations, and only one
corporation after the transfer.’”); Pancrantz v. Monsanto Co., 547 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa
1996) (“Under the expanded approach to the mere continuation exception,
the focus is on the continuity of the seller's business operation and not the continuity of
its management and ownership.”). See also Nilsson v. Cont’l Mach. Mfg. Co., 251 Ill.
App. 3d 415, 417-18 (1993) (refusing to recognize the “mere continuation” approach
where no continuity of ownership, including continuity of stock ownership existed).
Other courts requiring continuity of shareholders for application of the “mere
continuance” approach include Colorado (CMCB Enter., Inc. v. Ferguson, 114 P.3d 90
(Colo. 2005)) (“The mere continuation exception applies when there is a continuation of
directors, management, and shareholder interest and, in some cases, inadequate
consideration.”) (emphasis added)); Illinois (Vernon v. Schuster, 688 N.E.2d 1172,
1176-77 (Ill. 1997)) (quoting Tucker v. Paxton Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620, 625 (8th Cir.
1981)) (“[T]he majority of courts considering this exception emphasize a common
identity of officers, directors, and stock between the selling and purchasing corporation as
the key element of a ‘continuation.’”) (emphasis added)); New Mexico (Garcia v. Coe
Mfg., Inc., 933 P.2d 243, 247 (N.M. 1997)) (“Generally, a continuation of the transferor
corporation occurs where there is (1) a continuity of directors, officers, and shareholders;
(2) continued existence of only one corporation after sale of the assets; and (3) inadequate
consideration for the sale of the assets.”) (emphasis added)); Ohio (McGaw v. S. Bend
Lathe, Inc., 598 N.E.2d 18 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991)) (An asset purchase is subject to the
legal consequences of a merger under the de facto merger exception if: (1) there is a
continuation of the enterprise of the seller in terms of continuity of management,
personnel, physical location, assets, and operations; (2) there is a continuity of
shareholders, accomplished by payment for the assets with shares of stock; (3) the seller
ceases operations, liquidates, and dissolves as soon as legally and practically possible;
and (4) the purchasing corporation assumes the obligations of the seller necessary for the
uninterrupted continuation of business operations.) (emphasis added)); and Utah (Decius
v. Action Collection Svc., Inc., 105 P.3d 956, 959 (Utah 2004) (employment
discrimination case)) (“[T]he ‘mere continuation’, considers not whether the ‘business
operations’ continued, but whether the ‘corporate entity’ continued . . . . A continuation
demands ‘a common identity of stock, directors, and stockholders and the existence of
only one corporation at the completion of the transfer.’”) (emphasis added)).
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theory. This may not come as a surprise, as other courts have recognized the potential
among courts to take such an approach. As stated by the Third Circuit in Philadelphia
Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., “One may retain the traditional exceptions but expand their
boundaries, so that "merger" or "continuation" are held to include cases they once would
not have included.”98
Although Roper is not a products liability case, but rather a suit for payment of
services, the court did not limit the holding to service contract cases. The court even
relied on a successor products liability cases to support its holding.99 That products
liability case, Ray v. Alad Corp., is the case most commonly cited as spawning one of the
less restrictive approaches, the product line approach.100
Whether Missouri will ultimately follow its pronouncements in Roper in a
products liability context remains to be seen. For now, the authors do not count Missouri
as having adopted the continuity of enterprise approach. Time will tell, however, if
Missouri continues to reject the continuity of enterprise by name, but applies it in
principle through an expanded “mere continuation” test. Time will also tell if other
courts follow suit.101
As addressed below, New York recently rejected the product line approach.102
However, a New York court also recently hinted at overlap between the traditional
approach and the less restrictive continuity of enterprise approach. In In Re Seventh
Judicial Dist. Asbestos Litigation, a New York Supreme Court noted: “Assuming that the
98 Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 312 (3d Cir. 1985) (negligence
and nuisance environmental cleanup lawsuit).
99 See, e.g., Roper, 60 S.W.3d at 712 (citing Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977)). 
100 See Nilsson, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 418 (recognizing that the product line approach was
“first espoused by the California Supreme Court” in Ray.).
101 The United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit recently certified to the Utah
Supreme Court the questions of whether the product line and/or continuity of enterprise
approaches apply in Utah. See Tabor v. The Metal Ware Corp., 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS
14793, *406 (10th Cir. May 26, 2006).
102 See infra notes 104-118 and accompanying text.
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exception, under Schumacher, pertaining to merger and consolidation would encompass
‘de facto merger,’ and further that there is no one factor, including continuity of
ownership, which is determinative on that issue, there is very little, if any, distinction
between the exceptions of ‘continuity of enterprise’ and consolidation and merger.”103
B. Jurisdictions Recently Rejecting One or More of the Less Restrictive
Approaches
Although not all courts addressing the issue of corporate successor liability in the
last six years have adopted the continuity of enterprise or products line approaches, those
courts for the first time rejecting either of these approaches in favor of the traditional
approach in products liability cases have been few. The most prominent of the few
jurisdictions rejecting one of the less restrictive successor liability approaches for the first
time in the new millennium is New York. In Semenetz v. Sherling & Walden, Inc.,104 the
Court of Appeals of New York expressly declined to address the viability of the
continuity of enterprise approach under the facts of the case at hand, but it rejected the
product line approach.
Semenetz involved an Alabama corporation selling an allegedly defective and
injury-causing sawmill to Semenetz Lumber Mill, Inc.105 After the accident but before the
plaintiff commenced a products liability action, the Alabama corporation sold most of its
assets to a successor corporation with an express waiver of all liabilities.106 The successor
corporation moved for summary judgment, asserting, among other things, that successor
103 In re Seventh Judicial Dist. Asbestos Litig., 788 N.Y.S.2d 579, 583 (Sup. Ct. 2005).
There are other examples of the fluidity of the different approaches. See, e.g., Gladstone
v. Stuart Cinemas, Inc., 878 A.2d 214, 221 n.4 (Vt. 2005) (in a case to collect a debt,
recognizing that “[a]s they have evolved, there is little difference between the de facto
merger exception and the mere continuation exception. . . . We view the name of the
exception as unimportant.”) (citations omitted).
104 2006 N.Y. LEXIS 1485, 2006 NY Slip Op. 4750 (June 13, 2006).
105 Id. at *1.
106 Id. at *2.
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liability should not apply.107 When the motion eventually reached New York’s high court,
it declined to follow the line of lower New York cases supporting the product line
approach, and it rejected the doctrine.
The court’s rejection of the product line approach was based largely on apparent
misperceptions. One is that the product line approach threatens “economic annihilation
for small businesses because they have limited assets.”108 In reaching this conclusion, the
court neglected to note that, as addressed below, liability may be channeled back to the
predecessor corporation through a lower purchase price discounted by the amount needed
to purchase insurance against foreseeable risks, and that insurance protection appears to
be readily available for successor liability lawsuits.109
The court also cited the Restatement (Third)’s argument that “adoption of the
‘product line’ exception would mark ‘a radical change from existing law implicating
complex economic considerations best left to be addressed by the Legislature.’”110 This
reasoning is misguided for several reasons. First, as described in Redesigning Successor
Liability, the Restatement (Third) was simply wrong in its assertion that only a small
minority of jurisdictions follow one or both of the less restrictive approaches.111 Rather,
the number of jurisdictions adopting one or both of the less restrictive approaches is in
the same ballpark as the number of jurisdictions following the restrictive traditional
approach.112 Thus, it is not a “radical departure” to utilize the product line approach, and
there appears to be no evidence that the product line approach has caused significant
107 Id. at *4.
108 Id. at *10, quoting Bernard v. Kee Manufacturing Co., Inc., 409 So. 2d 1047 (Fla.
1982).
109 See infra notes 193-194 and accompanying text.
110 Semenetz, at *12, quoting City of New York v. Pfizer & Co., 260 A.D. 174, 176 (N.Y.
App. 1999) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 12 cmt. 6 &
reporter’s note).
111 See Cupp, supra note 22, at 852-58; see also supra notes 22-28 and accompanying
text.
112 See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
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problems for small (or large) businesses in California, Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
Washington, or any of the other often-sizable jurisdictions that utilize the approach.
Further, the leave-it-to-the-legislature argument, while wise in many other
contexts, represents particularly bad public policy in this context. For more than 30 years
legislatures have failed to heed calls for effective and fair statutory approaches to
successor liability.113 A significant factor in the failure of legislation is the “race to the
bottom” motivation inherent in potential successor liability laws. As noted in Redesigning
Successor Liability:
Unless almost all states enact effective legislation, corporate managers
determined to dissolve and to eliminate tort liability for future products
liability claims could simply reincorporate in another state that does not
provide effective protection for long-tail claimants. They could then
dissolve in the more business-friendly state, avoiding future liability.
Individual states that enact legislation adequately protecting victims of
defective products would risk chasing away businesses to other states.
Incentives to race to the bottom might be stronger yet in legislation not
involving dissolution.114
Further, while the business community has effective lobbying ability, “the lobby for long-
tail . . . claimants is exceedingly weak.”115 The problem of an absence of successor
liability, if thought about at all, would likely appear technical and complex to the average
consumer, and thus potential defective product victims are politically unlikely to clamor
for fair laws.116 Finally, it is important to note that the traditional approach to successor
liability is a common law creation of the courts, not the legislatures.117 Courts are less
likely to intrude upon legislative authority when reversing harmful public policy
consequences caused by their own common law creations.
113 See Cupp, supra note 22, at 879-81.
114 Id. at 881-82.
115 Green, supra note 16, at 59.
116 See Cupp, supra note 22, at 883.
117 See id., supra nn. 877-78.
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Thus, New York’s rationale for its rejection of the products line approach is
questionable. It is worth noting again that the Court of Appeals declined to decide
whether the continuity of enterprise approach will be adopted in New York, because the
plaintiff did not rely upon continuity of enterprise in her appeal.118 However, based on its
reasoning in rejecting the product line approach, the future of continuity of enterprise in
New York is questionable as well.
In addition to New York, the Kentucky Supreme court refused to adopt the
product line approach in 2002, but it did not consider the continuity of enterprise
approach.119 The next year, the New Hampshire Supreme Court indicated that it would
not recognize the continuity of enterprise approach.120 Since 1999, only these courts have
in published state appellate or federal decisions considered and for the first time clearly
rejected either the product line or continuity of enterprise approach in favor of the
traditional approach to successor liability in products liability cases.121 Of these states,
Kentucky was already considered by many – including the Restatement (Third)122 – to
118 Semenetz, 2006 N.Y. LEXIS 1485, at *6 n.2.
119 Pearson ex rel. Trent v. Nat’l Feeding Sys., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Ky. 2002).
120 Bielagus v. EMRE Corp., 826 A.2d 559, 568-69 (N.H. 2003). The Bielagus case
regarded debts owed on a promissory note, but the court noted that the continuity of
enterprise approach would not apply in tort (including products liability) or contract
cases. See id.
121 In 2003, an Arizona appellate court declined to apply the continuity of enterprise and
product line approaches, but rather deferred to the state legislature to determine whether
the less restrictive approaches would become part of the fabric of Arizona law. See
Winsor v. Glasswerks PHX, LLC, 63 P.3d 1040, 1046-48 (Ariz. App. 2003). In 2005,
the South Carolina Supreme Court applied the traditional factors in determining
successor liability, but did not consider (and therefore did not reject) the less restrictive
approaches. The court's failure to consider the less restrictive approaches drew strong
criticism in a dissenting opinion. See Simmons v. Mark Lift Indus., Inc., 622 S.E.2d 213,
216-17 (S.C. 2005) (Burnett, J., dissenting). Interestingly, South Carolina passed a
statute in 2006 limiting successor liability in asbestos litigation to limited to the fair
market value of the total gross assets of the transferor determined as of the time of the
merger or consolidation. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-81-140 (2006).
122 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 12 cmt. c.
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have rejected the less restrictive approaches based on a 1987 Sixth Circuit opinion
applying Kentucky law.123
The number of states that have for the first time clearly adopted the product line
or continuity of enterprise approach in the new millennium is about the same as the
number that have adopted the traditional approach for the first time. Although Professor
Richard Epstein opposes the trend, he agrees that jurisdictions continue to adopt the less
restrictive approaches.124
An updated count of jurisdictions applying the different approaches confirms that
the judicial landscape remains varied. As of mid-2006, nineteen states have clearly
adopted the traditional approach to determining successor products liability.125 Twelve
123 See Conn v. Fales Div. of Mathewson Corp., 835 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1987) (applying
Kentucky law).
124 Epstein, supra note 35, at 1168-69 (referring to “the (growing) minority of cases that
take one of two less restrictive positions on successor liability.”). See also 46 AM. JUR. 2D
Proof of Facts § 2 (2004) (“[I]t appears that the number of jurisdictions adopting an
expanded version of the “mere continuation” approach is increasing, . . .”).
125 The count includes states that adopted the traditional approach through either state
supreme court decisions, lower court decisions, or federal court decisions attempting to
apply state law. The count includes New Hampshire, even though the pertinent case was
not a products liability case, based on the court’s indicating it was rejecting the continuity
of enterprise approach even in products liability cases. That being said, the nineteen
states include Arkansas (Swayze v. A.O. Smith Corp., 694 F. Supp. 619, 622-24 (E.D.
Ark. 1988) (applying Arkansas law)); Colorado (Johnston v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 830
P.2d 1141 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992)); Florida (Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047
(Fla. 1982)); Illinois (Nilsson v. Cont’l Mach. Mfg. Co., 621 N.E.2d 1032 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993)); Iowa (Pancratz v. Monsanto Co., 547 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1996)); Kentucky
(Pearson ex rel. Trent v. Nat’l Feeding Sys., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Ky. 2002), Conn v.
Fales Div. of Mathewson Corp., 835 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1987)); Maryland (Nissen Corp.
v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564 (Md. 1991)); Minnesota (Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438
N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1989)); Missouri (Chem. Design, Inc. v. Am. Standard, Inc., 847
S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)); Nebraska (Jones v. Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 320
N.W.2d 481 (Neb. 1982)); New Hampshire (Bielagus v. EMRE Corp., 826 A.2d 559,
568-69 (N.H. 2003) (rejecting continuity of enterprise), Simoneau v. S. Bend Lathe, Inc.,
543 A.2d 407, 407 (N.H. 1988) (rejecting product line approach)); North Carolina (Budd
Tire Corp. v. Pierce Tire Co., 370 S.E.2d 267 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988)); North Dakota
(Downtowner v. AcroMetal Prods., 347 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1984)); Oklahoma (Pulis v.
U.S. Elec. Tool Co., 561 P.2d 68 (Okla. 1977)); Texas (Mudgett v. Paxson Mach. Co.,
709 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986)); Vermont (Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 479
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states have unequivocally adopted either the continuity of enterprise and/or the product
line approach.126 Five of these states follow the continuity of enterprise approach.127 Six
states follow the product line approach.128 One state now follows both the continuity of
enterprise and product line approaches.129
A.2d 126 (Vt. 1984)); Virginia (Harris v. T.I., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 605 (Va. 1992)); West
Virginia (Davis v. Celotex Corp., 420 S.E.2d 557 (W. Va. 1992)); and Wisconsin (Fish v.
Amsted Indus., Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820 (Wis. 1985)).
126 Again, the count includes states that adopted the less restrictive approaches through
either state supreme court decisions, lower court decisions, or federal court decisions
attempting to apply state law. For a listing of the states, see infra notes 127-129 and
accompanying text.
127 States following the continuity of enterprise approach include Alabama (Asher v. KCS
Int'l, Inc., 659 So. 2d 598, 600 (Ala. 1995)); Alaska (Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto
Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49, 58 (Alaska 2001)); Michigan (Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co.,
244 N.W.2d 873, 881-82 (Mich. 1976)); Ohio (Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co.,
507 N.E.2d 331, 334 (Ohio 1987)); and South Carolina (Holloway v. John E. Smith's
Sons Co., 432 F. Supp. 454, 455 (S.C. 1977) (applying South Carolina law).
128 States following the product line approach include California (Ray v. Alad Corp., 560
P.2d 3, 10 (Cal. 1977)); New Jersey (Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc. 431 A.2d 811, 817
(N.J. 1981)); New Mexico (Garcia v. Coe Mfg. Co., 933 P.2d 243, 248-50 (N.M. 1997));
Pennsylvania (Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106, 110 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981));
and Washington (Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 388 (Wash. 1984)). Four
separate Connecticut lower courts have applied the product line exception. See Pastorick
v. Lyn-Lad Truck Racks, Inc., No. CV 960562426S, 1999 WL 608674, at *2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 1999); Sullivan v. A.W. Flint Co., No. CV 920339263, 1996 WL
469716, at *7, *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 1996); Kennedy v. Oshkosh Truck Corp.,
No. CV92 0510394S, 1995 WL 27400, at *2, *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995);
Copperthite v. Pytlik, No. 59053, 1992 WL 209660, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 25,
1992).
129 This state is Mississippi (Huff v. Shopsmith, Inc., 786 So. 2d 383, 388 (Miss. 2001)
(product line), Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 174-76 (5th Cir. 1985)
(continuity of enterprise)). New York’s current status regarding continuity of enterprise is
unclear. As addressed above, it has clearly rejected the product line approach. See supra
notes 104-118 and accompanying text. Its lower courts have made mixed and inconsistent
rulings on continuity of enterprise, and thus the status of the doctrine is unclear. For
examples of lower New York courts holding the successor liable if it is selling the same
product line sold by the predecessor or if it falls within the continuity of enterprise
approach, see McCaffrey v. Weaver Jack Corp., No. CV 89- 3910, 1992 WL 266923, at
*2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1992); Salvati v. Blaw-Knox Food & Chem. Equip., Inc., 497
N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (adopting continuity of enterprise). However, as
addressed above, Semenetz casts doubt on the future of continuity of enterprise in New
York even though it expressly declined to address the issue under the facts before it. See
supra notes 104-118 and accompanying text.
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II. Analyzing the Effectiveness of Successor Liability in Channeling
Responsibility Back to the Manufacturer
A. Channeling Responsibility: The Less Restrictive Approaches
The continuing use of the less restrictive approaches serves the interests of
corrective justice and public policy. Redesigning Successor Liability posited that the
continuity of enterprise and product line approaches more effectively channel
responsibility for products liability back to the predecessor corporation than does the
traditional approach.130 The article asserted that the less restrictive approaches do so by
forcing successor corporations to consider the projected cost of the predecessor's products
liability at the time the successor purchases the predecessor.131 If a successor corporation
has reason to believe it may sustain products liability costs related to the predecessor’s
product, it will offer less money in the transaction and may use the savings to purchase
appropriate insurance against potential successor liability. Thus, the responsible
predecessor will ultimately, and appropriately, bear most of the cost.
The article further advocated that the less restrictive approaches are more fair and
efficient than the traditional approach because “[p]roduct consumers may be less able
than successor corporations to plan for the possibility of loss following a predecessor's
dissolution and may have less ability to protect themselves from such loss.”132 The
potential successor, on the other hand, “is [often] in as good or better a position as the
predecessor manufacturer to determine whether products made by the predecessor are
defective and will lead to liability if the successor chooses to purchase the predecessor's
assets.”133 Although Redesigning Successor Liability recognized that allowing more
successor liability through application of the less restrictive approaches does place an
130 See Cupp, supra note 22, at 861, 863, 867, 895-96.
131 Id. at 861-63.
132 Id. at 867.
133 Id. at 867-68.
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additional burden on successor corporations to pay for defective products that they did
not make or sell, “[t]he burden of successor liability is mitigated by the existence of
readily available and relatively inexpensive insurance.”134
B. The Counterarguments
In Imperfect Liability Regimes,135 Professor Richard Epstein argued that the
possibility that liability concerns might scrub transactions is “overlooked in Professor
Cupp’s channeling argument.”136 In the 2002 article, Epstein asserted that adopting the
less restrictive approaches may lead corporations, for financial reasons and to avoid risk,
to liquidate or sell off assets piecemeal rather than sell to successors when the value of
potential legal claims against a corporation exceeds its market value.137 This, Epstein
argued, may result in a “relentless strategy of fragmentation [that will] destroy the going
concern value of the business.”138 It may also, in Professor Epstein’s estimation, make it
difficult for a future plaintiff to locate the appropriate defendants, and tort claimants may
often find it impossible to recover anything.139 On the other hand, removing successor
liability, while also limiting a tort claimant’s ability to recover, “at least preserves the
going concern value of the business.”140
Dismissing an argument that insurance could dissuade liquidation or at least
protect claimants in the event of liquidation, Epstein cited to administration and
foreseeability issues.141 Epstein argued that in many cases buyers will not be able “to
estimate this long tail of the initial exposure,”142 and that, in any event, it is not possible
to adequately insure when “neither buyers nor sellers of such businesses had any
134 Id. at 869-70.
135 Epstein, supra note 35.
136 Id. at 1170.
137 Id. at 1169-73.
138 Id. at 1170.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 1171-73.
142 Id. at 1172-73.
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awareness of the implicit products liability risk.”143 He cites asbestos, DES, and lead
paint as illustrations of situations where the risk was originally unknowable.144 On the
flip side, companies would be engaging in “expensive transactions to respond to a
nonexistent risk.”145
Professor Reilly echoed Professor Epstein’s concerns about unknowable risks in
her 2003 article entitled Making Sense of Successor Liability.146 Professor Reilly argued
that “Cupp’s model of the transferee as the least cost insurer of creditors’ loss misses an
important limitation on the transferee's capacity to channel or internalize creditors' risk of
loss to the debtor.”147 She asserted that Redesigning Successor Liability’s channeling-
back argument for imposing the less restrictive approaches to successor liability “does
not consider the hard case where neither the transferor nor transferee could have known
either the magnitude or the probability of loss from future claims against the
transferor.”148 On the insurance point, Professor Reilly argues that unknowable risks are
“by definition” not insurable, and there is therefore no incentive to internalize loss.149
143 Id. at 1173.
144 Id. at 1172 (“The one point that is clear about each and every one of these transactions
[lead pigment, asbestos, DES] is that neither buyers nor sellers of such businesses had
any awareness of the implicit products liability risk at the time these early corporate
transactions took place.”).
145 Id.
146 Reilly, supra note 36.
147 Id. at 790.
148 Id.
149 Id. Reilly also argues a fraud-based theory that “judicial rhetoric that elevates
continuity as a fraud-free justification for successor liability is the risk of unpredictable,
and potentially huge, transferee liability.” Id. at 791. Although “huge” transferee
liability may in fact occur, the size of the verdict in and of itself does not make the
invocation of the less restrictive approaches unfair, particularly when one considers that
the transferee corporation will be able to withstand a large verdict better than an
individual products liability plaintiff can withstand a tragic injury with no recourse. As
for the argument that the liability will be unpredictable, there is no indication that history
demonstrates any more unpredictability in these cases than in those where fraud-based or
other traditional approaches have been applied.
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C. A Response: Killing Again the Ghost of Imputed Liability for
Unforeseeable Risks
Professor Epstein’s and Professor Reilly’s critiques of the less restrictive
approaches fail to consider how courts address products liability claims involving truly
unforeseeable risks. Their concern that the less restrictive approaches to successor
liability will in many cases unfairly saddle corporations with liability when liability was
unforeseeable at the time assets were transferred seems to rely at least in part on a
misguided assumption -- that courts are generally willing to impute knowledge of risks
where those risks were not reasonably knowable at the time of manufacture or sale. To
the contrary, courts typically refuse to assign liability based on imputed knowledge in
products liability cases.150 Rather, most courts will only allow liability where the seller
(i.e., the predecessor corporation) knew or should have known of the product’s risks
when the product was sold. 151 This is true whether the claims are based on design defect
or failure to warn – in manufacturing flaw cases knowledge of risks is of limited
relevance under strict liability, and in any event the scope of liability for manufacturing
150 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. m (“Recognizing
the convergence of the theories of negligence and strict liability in design cases, the
commentators have argued that, for strict liability to be of any consequence in such
cases, knowledge of risks that were unknowable at the time of marketing should be
imputed to manufacturers. This, however, the courts have consistently failed to do.”);
Olson v. Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Iowa 1994) (“[W]e have refused in the
past to impose a duty upon manufacturers to warn of unknowable dangers.”); Brown v.
Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 480 (Cal. 1988) (“liability is conditioned on the actual or
constructive knowledge of the risk by the manufacturer as of the time the product was
sold or distributed.”); Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 557
(Cal. 1987) (“[W]e hereby adopt the requirement, as propounded by the Restatement
Second of Torts and acknowledged by the lower courts of this state and the majority of
jurisdictions, that knowledge or knowability is a component of strict liability for failure
to warn.”); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 386 (N.J. 1984) (“Similarly, as to
warnings, generally conduct should be measured by knowledge at the time the
manufacturer distributed the product. Did the defendant know, or should he have known,
of the danger, given the scientific, technological, and other information available when
the product was distributed; or, in other words, did he have actual or constructive
knowledge of the danger?”).
151 See supra note 150.
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defects tends to be significantly narrower than the scope of design and warning claims
since manufacturing defect claims typically involve only a sole defective product rather
than an entire product line.152 As recently noted by Professor David Owen, “The ghost of
the Wade-Keeton test (an often-used title for the practice of imposing liability for
unknowable risks) continues to haunt judicial halls, but its time has come and gone.”153
The Restatement (Third) recognizes and strongly supports the judicial rejection of
imposing responsibility for unknowable risks: “Although there is language in some cases
which appears to indicate a leaning toward imputation of knowledge of unknowable risks
upon the manufacturer, the overwhelming majority of courts have evaluated the product
on the basis of what dangers could have been known at the time of marketing.”154 The
Restatement (Third) concluded: “Given the criticism that has been leveled against the
imputation of knowledge doctrine and the relatively thin judicial support for it, it is here
rejected as a doctrinal matter.”155
The Restatement (Third)’s rejection of imputing knowledge of unknowable risks
reflects the views of numerous scholars. Several writers have debunked the idea that
courts typically do or should apply liability where risks are unforeseeable at the time of
sale.156 Even the scholars who initially proposed the concept of imputed knowledge,
152 Id.
153 DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 534 (West, 2005).
154 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. m (also recognizing that the
doctrine of imputed knowledge “has not worn well with time” and has “little support”
where it “significantly affects defendants’ liabilities.”).
155 Id.
156 See, e.g., 1 DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 500
(3d ed. 2000) (“At least one state legislature has abolished the judicial adoption of the
Wade-Keeton test, and one wonders at its staying power around the nation. Although the
ghost of the Wade-Keeton test continues to haunt judicial halls, its time has come and
gone.”); DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY 545 (3d ed. 1996)
(“As the notion of true ‘strict’ products liability has been sliding into disfavor in design
and warnings cases in recent years, the Wade-Keeton test has declined as well.”);
Michael D. Green, Negligence = Economic Efficiency: Doubts 75 TEX. L. REV. 1605,
1632 (1997) (“Keeton's advocacy for imputed knowledge had its apogee in 1982 when
the New Jersey Supreme Court accepted it in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.,
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Deans John Wade and Page Keeton,157 later in their careers disavowed the oft-criticized
and seldom-applied doctrine.158 Dean Wade, in particular, emphasized that he did not
intend the “assumed-knowledge” language to be taken completely literally: “Indeed, I
now would be inclined to think that there is no longer any particular value in using the
but it retains little vitality today.”); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski,
Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 265, 274 (1990) (“If we assume, under the fairness view, that a basic postulate of
legal duty is that the conduct the law seeks to induce is capable of being performed and,
as a corollary, that the law eschews imposing duties to perform impossible tasks, then
imposing liability for failure to warn of unknowable risks is grossly unfair. . . . A rule that
penalizes longevity and contradicts fundamental rules of risk spreading by asking the
impossible of manufacturers is counterproductive and likely headed for oblivion.”);
Aaron D. Twerski, A Moderate and Restrained Federal Product Liability Bill: Targeting
the Crisis Areas for Resolution, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 575, 607 (1985) (concluding
that most courts claiming to apply strict products liability are not prepared to impose
liability for information defendant could not have reasonably foreseen at time of
distribution); Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict Products
Liability: The Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1183, 1206 n.76 (1992)
(discussing courts’ refusal to impose upon manufacturers knowledge of all dangers in
product, whether they were unknowable at time of marketing or not); Charles C. Marvel,
Annotation, Strict Products Liability: Liability for Failure to Warn as Dependent on
Defendant’s Knowledge of Danger, 33 A.L.R. 4th 368, at §2 (1984-2004) (“Often citing
[RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j], the courts for the most part, in jurisdictions
generally espousing the doctrine of strict products liability (when a negligence theory is
applied, there is no question that actual or constructive knowledge is an essential
element), hold that liability based upon a failure to warn users of a product’s inherently
dangerous quality or characteristic may be imposed only where the manufacturer,
distributor, or seller, as the case may be, had actual or constructive knowledge of the
dangerous quality or characteristic.”).
157 See W. Page Keeton, Products Liability – Some Observations About Allocation of
Risks, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1329, 1335 (1966); John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort
Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 834-35 (1973).
158 See Keeton, supra note 39, at 586-87 (stating that “a product’s design should normally
be measured in terms of whether or not it was feasible to do a better job in the light of the
technology that was available at the time of manufacture.”); Wade, supra note 39, at 763-
64 (stating that the value of the imputed knowledge doctrine “was in explaining the
concept of strict liability when it was new by clearly contrasting it with negligence in
which the defendant’s actual culpability in failing to learn of the dangerousness of the
product had to be shown.”).
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assumed-knowledge language. . . . It always had overtones of fiction, and, like all
fictions, it can create difficulties if taken literally.”159
The trend away from imputed knowledge appears to be well-grounded. Strict
liability was not created as a means of imposing absolute liability, and imputing
knowledge of unknowable risks often leads to results at or near the line of absolute
liability.160 This is particularly true in failure to warn cases, where warnings are
generally quite inexpensive to provide.161 As one commentator has recognized, “It is
poor public policy to demand that product manufacturers make their products safer than
is technologically possible, or demand that manufacturers warn of unknowable risks.
Such ‘super strict liability’ discourages manufacturers from developing and marketing
new products, thereby depriving consumers of desirable goods.”162 Additionally,
scholars have noted the inherent inequities in a system founded on requiring performance
of impossible duties.163
159 Wade, supra note 39, at 763.
160 See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz, The Death of “Super Strict Liability”: Common Sense
Returns to Tort Law, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 179 (1991).
161 See Richard L. Cupp Jr. & Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products Liability
Versus Negligence: An Empirical Approach, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 874 (2002) 896-98
(2002).
162 See Schwartz, supra note 160, at 180.
163 See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, supra note 156, at 274 (“If we assume, under the
fairness view, that a basic postulate of legal duty is that the conduct the law seeks to
induce is capable of being performed and, as a corollary, that the law eschews imposing
duties to perform impossible tasks, then imposing liability for failure to warn of
unknowable risks is grossly unfair. . . . A rule that penalizes longevity and contradicts
fundamental rules of risk spreading by asking the impossible of manufacturers is
counterproductive and likely headed for oblivion.”).
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Further, clearly unknowable risks are relatively rare.164 This is in part due to the
standard courts apply holding manufacturers to the knowledge of experts in the field.165
In that capacity, “manufacturers must keep abreast of scientific knowledge, discoveries,
and advances, and are presumed to know what is imparted thereby.”166 What the
manufacturer actually knew is not the issue, but rather what the manufacturer could have
discovered by fulfilling its obligations as an expert.167 Under this standard, sellers
generally are accountable for risks associated with their products even without applying
an imputed knowledge approach.
Asbestos litigation -- an example Professor Epstein relies upon in his critique of
the less restrictive approaches as an example of a potentially unknowable risk168 – in
actuality provides an illustration of the rarity of clearly unknowable risks. Many experts
and courts now agree that the asbestos industry was in fact aware of the risks well before
they stopped marketing the product.169 This fits the too-familiar practice of manufacturers
164 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 reporter’s note, cmt. m
(quoting 4 FINAL REPORT OF THE LEGAL STUDY, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON
PRODUCTS LIABILITY 109-110 (1977)). See also Ellen Wertheimer, The Biter Bit:
Unknowable Dangers, The Third Restatement, and the Reinstatement of Liability Without
Fault, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 889, 898 (2005) (recognizing that the “original tests for defect
did not deal explicitly with the problem presented by liability for dangers that were
unknowable at the time the product was manufactured.”).
165 See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 386 (N.J. 1984) (“Further, a
manufacturer is held to the standard of an expert in the field.”).
166 63A AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1140 (2004). See also Klem v. E.I. Dupont De
Nemours Co., 19 F.3d 997, 1001-02 (5th Cir. 1994); George v. Celotex Corp., 914 F.2d
26, 28 (2d Cir. 1990).
167 See, e.g., Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 1985) (“Borel holds
all manufacturers to the knowledge and skill of an expert. They are obliged to keep
abreast of any scientific discoveries and are presumed to know the results of all such
advances. Moreover, they each bear the duty to fully test their products to uncover all
scientifically discoverable dangers before the products are sold.”). See also Anderson v.
Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 281 Cal. Rptr. 528, 538 (1991) (“[T]he manufacturer is
liable if it failed to give warning of dangers that were known to the scientific community
at the time it manufactured or distributed the product.”).
168 See Epstein, supra note 35, at 1165.
169 See Brown & Root, Inc. v. Moore, 92 S.W.3d 848, 856 (Tex. App. 2002) (holding that
decedent’s estate was entitled to exemplary damages because “evidence was raised that
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asserting that they were not aware of a risk, but being found by courts to have in fact
known about it, or that they should have known about it.170
Professor Epstein also cites DES and lead paint as examples of cases where
successor liability possibly could not be factored into a business sale price due to
unknowable risks.171 However, as with asbestos litigation, in these cases plaintiffs
generally have only been allowed to go forward when courts have found that the
manufacturer knew or should have known of the risk.172 Again, courts have generally
rejected the imputed knowledge approach in cases where risks were truly unknowable.173
And in the DES and lead paint cases, again similar to asbestos litigation and indeed most
Brown & Root had subjective knowledge of the risks associated with asbestos but acted
with conscious indifference to the rights of the workers at Lone Star Steel” during the
period of 1977-1985). See also Dartez, 765 F.2d at 461 (“If the dangers of asbestos were
known to Johns-Manville at the time of Dartez's exposure, then the same risks were
scientifically discoverable by other asbestos corporations. Therefore, the testimony of the
medical director of the industry's largest member is relevant to plaintiff's attempt to meet
the evidentiary burden defined by Borel.”).
170 Cigarette industry executives’ 1994 testimony before Congress that nicotine is not
addictive provides a particularly egregious illustration. See Nearly 50 Years of Conflict
Over Role of Smoking in Health, THE BALTIMORE SUN 6A, July 15, 2000.
171 See Epstein, supra note 35, at 1165.
172 See, e.g., Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 591 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ohio 1992) (DES case:
“The manufacturer does not breach its duty to warn – in negligence, in strict liability for
breach of warranty, or in strict liability in tort – until the company knew or should have
known of a particular risk through the exercise of ordinary care.”); Brown v. Superior
Court, 751 P.2d 470, 481 (Cal. 1988) (DES case: “Thus, we disagree with plaintiff’s
assertion that defendants should be held liable for failing to warn the physician who
prescribed DES to plaintiff's mother of alleged defects in the drug that were neither
known by defendants nor scientifically knowable at the time the drug was distributed.”);
McMahon v. Eli Lilly & Co., 774 F.2d 830, 835 (7th Cir. 1985) (DES case: “Under
Illinois precedent, to prevail on a failure to warn claim, a plaintiff must show ‘that the
manufacturer knew or should have known of the danger presented by the use or
consumption of the product’ and that the manufacturer did not warn of the product’s
‘dangerous propensities.’”) (citation omitted). Cf. David P. Swenson, “Market Share
Recovery for Risk” as a Preemptive Remedy for Childhood Lead Poisoning, 11 LAW &
INEQ. 585, 592 (June 1993) (“Property owners who sue paint manufacturers must prove
the manufacturers knew or should have known of the danger inherent in lead paint used
in residences and that by continuing to market lead paint they breached a duty to
foreseeable victims.”).
173 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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claims of unknowable risks, imputed knowledge may not even be needed, as arguments
now exist that the manufacturers in fact knew or should have known of the risks inherent
in those products when sales were being made.174 Asbestos, DES, and lead paint cases
help to disprove the notion that cases are generally proceeding despite the
unforeseeability of risks. Rather, in most instances judgments are only permitted or
upheld when courts find that product risks involved were at least reasonably knowable.
As argument may be asserted that even if manufacturers need to have been aware
of some level of product danger to be liable, perhaps they may not have been aware of the
amount of money that would have to spend in litigation, settlements and judgments
associated with the product risk they knew or should have known about.175 However, this
amounts to a criticism of tort law in general rather than a specific criticism of successor
liability. Manufacturers of defective products, and indeed all tort defendants, are liable to
all foreseeable plaintiffs for all foreseeable harm caused by their tortious acts or failures
to act.176 Challenges in knowing just how much the damages will total is not a novelty
174 See, e.g., Grover, 591 N.E.2d at 702 (Resnick, J., dissenting) (“In light of the
foregoing there can be no question that pharmaceutical companies should have known the
dangers of this drug. If in the 1930s and 1940s the manufacturers of DES knew or should
have known of the reproductive system defects in the animal fetus exposed to DES, how
then is it not foreseeable that this might mean abnormalities in the human fetus’
reproductive system? In other words, it would appear that DES manufacturers knew or
should have known that the human fetus exposed in utero might have a defect in the
female reproductive system. Additionally, is it not then foreseeable that that female fetus
would at some point seek to employ the defective reproductive system? The answer must
be a resounding ‘yes.’”); McMahon, 774 F.2d at 835-36 (“There was sufficient evidence
from which a jury could reasonably have found that in 1955 Lilly knew or should have
known that DES might cause reproductive abnormalities, such as prematurity, in the
female offspring of women exposed to DES during pregnancy.”); Thomas v. Mallett, 701
N.W.2d 523, 558 (Wis. 2005) (discussing in depth the scientific documentation of the
risks of lead poisoning and concluding that “[m]any of the individual defendants or their
predecessors-in-interest did more than simply contribute to a risk; they knew of the harm
white lead carbonate pigments caused and continued production and promotion of the
pigment notwithstanding that knowledge.”).
175 See Epstein, supra note 135, at 1170.
176 See generally Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 192 N.E. 99 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1928).
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reserved for successor liability claims, and it is not a persuasive criticism. If tort liability
were only allowed in personal injury cases where the amount potential damages is clearly
knowable, very few personal injury cases would ever be permitted. Further, “In back of
the tort system is an insurance system,” and insurance actuaries routinely factor in
potential liability variables when setting tort insurance rates.177 Indeed, for the relatively
brief times when liability insurance “crises” were widely heralded, arguments have been
made that the problems related more to unwise pricing practices by the insurance industry
than to an unpredictable tort system.178
In addition to addressing unforeseeability of risks, Professor Epstein also raises
the hypothetical situation where new theories of liability arise, and the seller is not able to
predict that they would arise.179 However, that type of situation would be quite rare –
efforts at new causes of action impacting large numbers of products cases do not succeed
very often in products liability’s maturing landscape (described by Professor Owen as the
“graying” of products liability).180 Indeed, Espstein’s primary example -- the novel use of
public nuisance theories for gun liability181 – does not appear to be catching on in the
courts. With limited exception, courts are unwilling to impose liability on gun
manufacturers for public nuisance. 182 The courts recognize that doing so would
177 VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE &
SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES & MATERIALS 2 (11th ed. 2005).
178 See OWEN, supra note 153, at 765.
179 Epstein, supra note 35, at 1172-73.
180 See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
181 See Epstein, supra note 35, at 1173.
182 See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71
U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 764 (2003) (“To date, litigation against gun manufacturers has
yielded the vast majority of legal opinions addressing the legal viability of the public
nuisance theory of recovery in the context of mass products liability. In most cases,
courts dismiss these public nuisance claims . . . .”). See also Frank J. Vandall, A
Preliminary Consideration of Issues Raised in the Firearms Sellers Immunity Bill, 38
AKRON L. REV. 113, 117 (2005) (“Strict liability and negligent design, as well as public
nuisance and fraud claims, have been rejected. The recent victories by the gun
manufacturers in both design defect and damage to cities, suggest that widespread
immunity is unnecessary at this time.”). Some of the cases rejecting public nuisance
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improperly “loosen the tort from the traditional moorings of duty, proximate causation,
foreseeability, and remoteness.”183
Further, when courts do not dismiss nuisance cases against gun manufacturers at
the pleading stages, some of those cases do not even involve products liability claims.
Rather, the allegations may be for “affirmative conduct on the part of manufacturers and
distributors that fosters an illegal secondary gun market that interfered with the public
right to safety”184 – claims involving risks most would agree are not unknowable, since
they allege affirmative misconduct. And even courts that allow public nuisance claims
based on products liability-like allegations to proceed beyond the pleading stages still
require or at least recognize proof of foreseeability.185
The resistance to public lawsuits against gun manufacturers, however, is simply
one example of a developing trend to limit products liability. Change in products liability
claims against gun manufacturers include: District of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A., Corp.,
872 A.2d 633 (D.C. 2005) (en banc) (rejecting public nuisance claims against gun
manufacturers and distributors); City of Chicago v. Beretta, U.S.A., Corp., 821 N.E.2d
1099 (Ill. 2004); Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A., Corp.,
273 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying New Jersey law) (same); City of Philadelphia v.
Beretta, U.S.A., Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882, 909-10 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (applying
Pennsylvania law) (“One way in which the role of public nuisance law has been restricted
is the refusal to apply the tort in the context of injuries caused by defective product
design and distribution.”); Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. #15 v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915
(8th Cir. 1993) (applying North Dakota law) (same).
183 Beretta, U.S.A., Corp., 872 A.2d 633, 646 (D.C. 2005).
184 See, e.g., Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1211 n.26 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying
California law) (“Plaintiff's nuisance claim, however, is not about the manufacture or
distribution of a defective or properly functioning product. Notably, plaintiffs do not
allege a product defect but rather allege affirmative conduct [such as oversaturation of the
market] on the part of manufacturers and distributors that fosters an illegal secondary gun
market that interfered with the public right to safety.”).
185 See, e.g., Cincinnati v. Beretta, U.S.A., Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1143 (Ohio 2002)
(municipality stated a claim for public nuisance against gun manufacturer when “the
complaint clearly alleged both intentional and negligent misconduct on appellees’ part.
For example, Paragraph 119 of the complaint alleged that defendants ‘intentionally and
recklessly market, distribute and sell handguns that defendants know, or reasonably
should know, will be obtained by persons with criminal purposes * * *.’”); White v.
Smith & Wesson Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 830 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (applying Ohio law)
(“Plaintiffs’ nuisance claims will likely rise or fall with their negligence claims.”).
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law has been slowing down, and the spirit of radical expansion has been replaced with a
more middle-of-the-road mentality.186 The recent expansion of asbestos liability raised as
a possible rejoinder to this point by Professor Epstein has not been so much an expansion
of legal theory by courts as an expansion of targeted defendants by plaintiffs’ lawyers,
with the targeting based on stream-of-distribution liability rules that predate the cessation
of asbestos sales, and the rules of joint and several liability that are much older yet. This
is not at all an argument that the expansion of asbestos liability is societally beneficial or
appropriate (indeed, one of this article’s authors has been and remains strongly critical of
the expansion),187 but rather that current cases are based primarily on legal doctrines that
existed when many or most of the product sales currently at issue in asbestos litigation
took place.
Professor David Owen describes the slowing down of products liability evolution
in The Graying of Products Liability:
In recent years, however, the law in this area has been evolving more
toward middle ground and compromise, away from the starker approaches
of its youth. The evolution of products liability law, mirrored in the new
Restatement, thus may be viewed as a progression from the blacks and
whites of early years to a modern blend of boring grays—‘reasonable,’
perhaps, from a variety of perspectives, but devoid of the lively clash of
claims of right and wrong that marked the early years.188
For better or worse, in most areas of products liability, courts and legislatures are in
general quite selective in expanding substantive liability rules, further minimizing
Professor Epstein’s concern. Hypothetical and unlikely concerns that doctrinal may some
day dramatically expand (with no evidence of such doctrinal expansion on the horizon)
186 See Epstein, supra note 35, at 1173.
187 See Generally Richard L. Cupp, Jr. Asbestos Litigation and Bankruptcy: A Case Study
for Ad Hoc Public Policy Limitations on Joint & Several Liability, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 203
(2003).
188 David G. Owen, The Graying of Products Liability Law: Paths Taken and Untaken in
the New Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1241, 1243 (1994).
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should not derail an approach to liability that provides the most desirable results in real
cases.
Analyzing whether the sky will fall if courts adopt the less restrictive approaches
to successor liability does not require hypothesizing. As discussed above, one or more of
the less restrictive approaches are in effect in several large states.189 If the approaches
were to cause the sky to fall, it should already be doing so in California and in many
other parts of the nation. Significantly, little if any evidence exists of any outcry that the
less restrictive successor liability rules are actually causing dissolutions or piecemeal
asset sales.190 To the contrary, some advisors have even counseled companies to seek to
prevent predecessor corporation dissolutions as a way of avoiding successor liability, at
least under the merger and consolidation theories of successor liability.191 Thus, the
situation “on the ground” seems to be another practical endorsement of the less restrictive
approaches. A ready insurance market is presently covering successor liability claims,
providing protection to successor corporations concerned about inheriting liability.192
189 See supra notes 40-129 and accompanying text.
190 Cf. Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49, 56 (Alaska 2001) (“But we
have not been referred to any evidence that adopting this ‘continuity of enterprise’
exception (or the marginally more popular ‘product line’ exception) has in fact increased
the number of corporate liquidations or piecemeal breakups, or that rejecting the modern
exceptions has in fact decreased liquidations or piecemeal sales.”); Simmons v. Mark Lift
Indus., Inc., 622 S.E.2d 213, 221 (S.C. 2005) (Burnett, J., dissenting) (“I reject as
speculative and unfounded the argument that holding a successor liable in a product
liability action will damage business interests or prompt rash decisions by corporations.
Terex has not cited, nor have I found, any studies or evidence demonstrating that the
view I propose would inhibit asset-based transactions, lead to increased piecemeal sales,
or discourage large-scale transfers. Potential legal liability often is a factor every
responsible corporation must consider; however, it is not the driving or primary force
behind every decision. Successors contracting for an asset transfer in a free market, when
they intend to continue the basic enterprise, will negotiate a price which reflects the fair
market value of the transfer, taking heed of the risk of future claims.”).
191 Robert M. Folger, Buying, Selling, and Combining Businesses Under the Colorado
Business Corporation Act, 33 COLO. LAW. 73, 77 (Nov. 2004) (“Acquirers seeking to
avoid successor liability may wish to take steps (through a covenant or other binding
obligation) to prevent the immediate post-sale dissolution of the Seller.”).
192 Telephone interview with Jeff Brown, Chubb Insurance, July 26, 2006.
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According to an expert in the field, businesses purchasing predecessor corporations or
product lines presenting the greatest risks of products liability are, appropriately, the most
likely to invest in successor products liability insurance.193
III. Conclusion.
Courts’ struggle over whether to apply the traditional approach or one of the less
restrictive approaches to successor liability is ongoing. Cases in recent years have
demonstrated that the less restrictive approaches are continuing to find new jurisdictional
homes, and are neither “dead to growth” nor the subject of “overwhelming judicial
rejection” as asserted by the Restatement (Third).194 However, other recent decisions
rejecting one or more of the less restrictive approaches show that none of the approaches
– traditional or less restrictive -- are on the verge of achieving dominance.
Although none of the approaches are currently dominant, the less restrictive
approaches are better. Someone has to lose when an innocent consumer is injured by a
defective product and only an innocent successor corporation is available as a defendant.
The difference between the innocent consumer and the innocent successor corporation is
that the successor corporation has a means by which to protect itself and channel
responsibility back to the responsible predecessor corporation through a discounted
purchase price if the less restrictive approaches are applied. Under the traditional
approach, the consumer – the only party with no realistic options for shifting
responsibility to the party that caused the harm – generally bears the entire loss alone.
Recent academic criticisms that the less restrictive approaches unfairly saddle
successor businesses with unforeseeable risks ring hollow, as courts, supported by the
mainstream of scholars, reject applying even strict liability when risks are truly
unforeseeable (which are in any event unusual situations). Calls to abandon
improvements to the court-made traditional approach to the legislatures are unconvincing
193 Id.
194 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 12 reporter’s note, cmt. b.
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in light of more than 30 years of legislative failure to enact meaningful reform.
Legislatures’ race-to-the-bottom incentive to leave consumers unprotected in product
defect cases involving successor corporations, along with the lack of an effective
consumer lobby to address issues that are decidedly unfriendly to sound-bite politics,
leave no reason to expect that effective legislative reform is anywhere on the horizon.
The less restrictive approaches best serve corrective justice and public policy; courts
engaged in the ongoing judicial redesign of successor liability should embrace them.
